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REPLY
MARTHA NUSSBAUM

T is a pleasure to respond to the papers in this symposium. I am very
grateful to all the participants for their thoughtful engagement with my
book and for teaching me so much about Catholic traditions of ethical
and political thought. In this brief and inadequate set of replies, I will
confine myseff to issues about my book and will try, for the most part, to
avoid sorting out the differences of opinion that the papers manifest
about the right way to interpret the works of Jacques Maritain and John
Courtney Murray. I note that there are such differences, and it would be
interesting for readers to ponder them. I now simply comment briefly on
each paper.

1.

REPLY TO GREENAWALT

I am extremely grateful to Greenawalt for his searching discussion.
Greenawalt is a magnificent scholar whose two books on the Religion
Clauses are an essential starting point for any further work on them. Unfortunately for me, the volume on Free Exercise came out just before the
book went into copy edit, so I was unable to consult it as extensively as I
would have liked; the volume on Establishment came out too late for consultation. But at least I can record my admiration for it here.
I begin with a few smaller points. First, I think we can show that the
Pilgrims were motivated not only by a search for liberty but also by the
awareness that liberty was unequally distributed in England. How, indeed,
could they not be? They were subjected to brutal harassment, as the dominant majority was not. They were treated as a minority without civil rights
equal to that of the majority. Insofar as they acted in response to that
problem, they were looking for non-subordination, and that is what I
mean by saying that they were concerned with equality. As for their subsequent conduct, they did not persecute as aggressively as did the later Puritans, but they were persecutory enough to be unable to live with Roger
Williams, so I think my statement that they failed to investigate and consistently apply their own non-subordination idea is correct. I never say,
however, that they had a "developed philosophy" of equality. I am sure
they did not.
As for Williams: Greenawalt cannot refute my reading of his philosophical works simply by pointing out that he frequently alludes to his own
religious views. Of course he does, and nobody who reads them could be
unaware of that fact. The question that must be faced, however, concerns
the structure of his arguments for his primary philosophical conclusions:
do these arguments rely on the religious doctrines as essential premises, or
(677)
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do they not? Seventeenth century writers were fond of larding their writings with allusions and citations of all sorts, particularly to the Bible and
other religious texts. Hugo Grotius, an exact contemporary of Williams, is
a neat parallel in this respect. Grotius, however, helpfully informs his
readers, in the Prolegomena to De lure Belli Ac Pacis,I that these religious
doctrines are absolutely inessential to his arguments. In a famously scandalous sentence, he points out that his conclusions would follow "even if
we should concede (etiamsi daremus, words that became famous as a name
for the scandal) that which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or that the affairs of men are of no concern
to Him." 2 Without that sentence, no doubt many interpreters would have
thought that the religious references that are so frequent in the subsequent text supplied premises essential for Grotius's conclusions. Grotius
informs us that this is not the case: the arguments are independent of
religion. What I am saying about Williams is that he argues like Grotius: in
such a way that his conclusions follow even if we leave aside the religious
doctrines, thus in a way that can be followed and accepted by someone
who does not share Williams's own religious views. Since Williams had
very heterodox religious opinions, and therefore was writing to an audience composed primarily of people who did not share his views, a reconstruction of the arguments that shows how he might have expected them
to persuade such people seems to me to have advantages over one that
makes them depend on a view that, as Williams knew, almost nobody accepted. I offer such a reconstruction. Now the ball is in the other court: it
is incumbent upon critics to show that my reconstruction doesn't work,
and/or to propose a superior one, going into the detail of the text.
As for Williams's influence: I have no wish to claim that Williams's
books, published in England, were influential in America. But he was a
voluminous correspondent, and his public letters to the colony of Rhode
Island were public documents of much influence, as was the charter he
helped Charles II design. For many decades, moreover, he administered
that colony and designed its institutions. So his political practice is what I
think influential, and the theory that evidently and conspicuously underlay that practice. (Many of his public letters are highly theoretical, concerning such matters as the nature of conscience, the idea of religionbased accommodation, and much more.) Not everyone liked Rhode Island: but by Independence, even those colonies that still had established
churches all had, in their state constitutions, very strong defenses of liberty
of conscience in the Williams spirit.
Concerning the specialness of religious conscience, Greenawalt and I
do not have a large difference, I believe. I take very seriously the issue of
fairness to non-religious comprehensive doctrines, and I therefore pro1. HuGo GROTIUs, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND
Tuck ed., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2005) (1625).

PEACE, BOOK

III 1745-62 (Richard

2. Id. at 1748.
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pose that, if we wish to defend accommodations, we broaden the notion of
conscience to include many good-faith searchers after meaning whose
views do not fit a standard religious definition. Greenawalt agrees, where
the draft is concerned. He proposes a sterner standard for drug cases. I
agree that in those cases we face a larger problem of sincerity, and to that
extent, he may, after all, be right to propose a more stringent inquiry.
Philosopher that I am, I am indeed, as he says, "nervous" about having
different principles in different areas. I would prefer a consistent and
principled approach. The problem is complicated by the fact that I do not
believe drug laws are good public policy or, indeed, good philosophy. (I
am a Millian about the criminal law.) So for me, one way of achieving a
consistent principled approach might involve jettisoning the drug laws.
But I agree that if we keep existing drug laws, we have to have some way of
screening out bogus claimants, and to that extent, Greenawalt's proposal,
as a practical strategy, may be the best we can do.
On the question of religious groups and non-discrimination: I do not
address that issue in Liberty of Conscience, but it is a hugely important issue,
and I shall address some parts of it in my Reply to Brennan.
The bulk of this Reply, however, will now be devoted to answering
Greenawalt on his fourth question: the question about "public reasons."
Greenawalt says that in Liberty of Conscience I discuss the issue of "public
reason": that is, what sorts of arguments should citizens of a pluralistic
society give one another in various different contexts, and are religious
arguments appropriately among such arguments? I was not aware that I
had discussed that issue in Liberty of Conscience, and if I did allude to it, it
must have been extremely briefly, for it forms no part of the argument I
was presenting there. I do, however, have views on the topic, and, since
Greenawalt presses me, I think it is time to say what they are. Before I can
do that, however, I will need to give a much more detailed description of
issue, which is primarily a debate
the debate that has unfolded around this
3
about John Rawls's PoliticalLiberalism.
Rawls's basic aim in PoliticalLiberalism is to show that a liberal political
conception of justice can be the object of an overlapping consensus
among people who hold a wide range of different religious and secular
comprehensive conceptions of the good. Only in this way, he believes, can
the conception be justified to citizens of faith; and the wholehearted acceptance of the political conception by citizens of faith is, in his view, a key
to the very survival of liberal democracy. Many aspects of Rawls's program
have won broad acceptance among thinkers representing a range of religious traditions. But one important part of his argument has occasioned
ongoing controversy: the characterization of public reason and the related
arguments concerning the "duty of civility." This controversy was of great
3. JOHN RAwLs, POLITIcAL LIBERALISM (expanded ed. 1996). I defend the view
expressed in this section at greater length in an Introduction to a volume of essays
commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of Political Liberalism, edited by me
and Thom Brooks, and under contract to Columbia University Press.
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concern to Rawls. In order to address it he revised his view in two successive stages: first, in the Introduction that he added to the Paperback Edition of PoliticalLiberalism in 1996; and then, extending and clarifying this
revision, in the important article "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,"
first published in the University of Chicago Law Review. 4 The article is cru-

cial to a full understanding of Rawls's view on this important topic. Although Rawls's revised view is surely not beyond criticism, it is important
to distinguish criticism based on misunderstanding from criticism of the
view as it is presented; to do this, we need to spend some time clarifying
the notion of public reason.
According to Rawls, citizens in a constitutional democracy engage in
many types of reasoning. Many of these go on within what he calls the
"background culture," a concept that includes both what is commonly
called "civil society" and many parts of the political culture itself.5 It is very
important to recognize that Rawls holds an extremely inclusive view of the
forms of reasoning that can and should occur within the background culture. Citizens may appeal to any aspect of their comprehensive doctrine at
any time, and Rawls does not even introduce any sort of moral ideal concerning how they ought to speak to one another. In this respect his view
of public debate is much less restrictive than that ofJurgen Habermas, or
the view of democracy advanced in some recent American writings on "deliberative democracy. "6
There are certain issues, however, in discussing which citizens ought
to focus on the fundamental commitment to mutual respect and reciprocity on which the entire political conception is based. These are what Rawls
often calls "constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice." 7 These
include both structural issues-how basic political institutions are defined
and related to one another, "the powers of the legislature, executive and
the judiciary; the scope of majority rule"-and the definition of fundamental "equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship ... such as the right
to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of conscience, freedom of
thought and of association, as well as the protections of the rule of law." 8
In the economic sphere, a social minimum "providing for the basic needs
of all citizens" is an essential, but Rawls's own more demanding and contentious "difference principle" is not.9 It is extremely important to recognize how specific and how narrow the range of issues that trigger the duty

4. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765 (1997).

5. See id. at 767-68.
6. See, e.g., Amy
MENT

GUTMANN

&

DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREE-

(1996).

7. RAWLS, supra note 3, at 227-30; Rawls, supra note 4, at 767.

8. RAwis, supra note 3, at 227.
9. Thus, "matters of basic justice" are not coextensive with "matters regulating
the basic structure."
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of civility is. "[T] he limits imposed by public reason do not apply to all
political questions." 10
In such fundamental areas, Rawls argues citizens ought to reason with
one another using ideas and conceptions that all citizens can be expected
not only to understand but also to accept. Our "exercise of political power
is proper and hence justifiable" only when it is exercised in accordance
with principles that all citizens can be expected to endorse.1 1 This being
the case, citizens ought to argue for these principles using concepts and
premises that they can expect other citizens, holding different comprehensive doctrines, to accept. To argue in this way is to show adequate
respect for one's fellow citizens, who can be expected to hold a wide range
of different comprehensive doctrines. (Although Rawls does not make
this point sufficiently explicit, he is clearly thinking of discussions in the
context of political decision-making, not the sort of discussion of constitutional ideas and conceptions in which citizens often engage in informal
social associations in the "background culture.")
What can such citizens expect one another to share? The "freestanding" concepts, principles, and arguments of the political conception (or
family of conceptions): that is all. So, they should make their arguments
in these fundamentally important matters using the materials of the political conception and that alone.
That is what Rawls means by the "duty of civility." 12 This duty "also
involves a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in deciding
when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made."' 3 The
duty of civility is a moral ideal and has no legal status. Thus, there is absolutely no question of citizens being restricted in their speech or given
14
lower civic status on account of their nonobservance of this ethical duty.
(People who speak of Rawls "silencing" religious citizens may possibly have
misunderstood the nature of Rawls's recommendation.) And it obtains in
areas that could not possibly even be known to others, much less enforced
by them: thus, it obtains not only when citizens are acting as legislators
making proposals or as judges deciding cases involving constitutional essentials, but also when they are simply voting in the privacy of the voting
booth, on issues that involve such essentials. Even then, says Rawls, they
ought to endeavor to vote not simply in order to advance personal interests, but on the basis of reasons that they can expect their fellow citizens to
share, as elements in the political conception they also share. Voting, although secret, is not a merely private matter, where such fundamentals are
at issue: a moral ideal of reciprocity indicates that citizens ought to respect
10. RAwLs, supra note 3, at 214.
11. See id. at 217.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. People who speak of Rawls "silencing" religious citizens may possibly have
misunderstood the nature of Rawls's recommendation.
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one another even when they can get away (in terms of ethical criticism)
with not doing so.
Rawls made it increasingly clear, in the later versions of his view, that
the political conception should not be understood as a single account of
political justice, but rather as a family of such accounts, the members of
which would change over time. There are many acceptable liberal politi15
cal conceptions that might fall within the overlapping consensus.
Rawls's own conception is only one member of this family of "reasonable
political conceptions."1 6 Another, he says, would be Habermas's discourse
conception; another would be "Catholic views of the common good and
solidarity when they are expressed in terms of political values.'1 7 New doctrines may also be proposed over time, and this is important: "otherwise
the claims of groups or interests arising from social change might be repressed and fail to gain their appropriate political voice." 18 But "[t]he
limiting feature of these forms is the criterion of reciprocity, viewed as
applied between free and equal citizens, themselves seen as reasonable
and rational." 19 Thus, Rawls implies that public reason is never univocal
and may contain within itself many types of disagreement. Argument on
matters of basic justice will never be the mere application to a situation of
principles already spelled out. (He also stresses that there may be many
differences about how to assign weight to relevant considerations in a particular case.)
Public reason is not secular reason, Rawls stresses.20 By secular reason, he means reasoning in terms of a non-religious comprehensive doctrine. 21 Such doctrines are treated exactly the same way we treat religion:
that part of the doctrine that figures in the political conception is a legitimate source of arguments in public reason. Utilitarians and other holders
of ethical comprehensive doctrines are asked to be just as abstemious as
22
religious believers.
What, however, becomes of the non-shared aspects of the comprehensive doctrines of citizens? When may citizens who accept the ideal of civility invoke aspects of their comprehensive doctrine that do not figure in
the political conception or conceptions? Here again, Rawls's position
evolved in response to criticism. In Political Liberalism, he contrasts two
different approaches one might take to this question. The first, which he
calls the "exclusive view," holds that "reasons given explicitly in terms of
15. See RAwLS, supra note 3, at I-li.

16. See Rawls, supra note 4, at 767.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 775.
Id.
Id. at 774.
See id. at 775.
See id.

22. In that sense, Rawls's position is very different from the influential position of Robert Audi. See, e.g., Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and the
Obligations of Citizenship, in PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AA.uns 259-96 (1989).
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comprehensive doctrines are never to be introduced into public reason." 23 The second, which he calls the "inclusive view," holds that in certain situations citizens may present the "basis of political values rooted in
their comprehensive doctrine, provided that they do so in ways that
strengthen the ideal of public reason itself."24 Rawls now argues that the
choice between the two conceptions should be made by asking which one
"best encourages citizens to honor the ideal of public reason and secures
25
In terms
its social conditions in the long run in a well-ordered society."

of this question, the inclusive view seems to him superior because it is
more flexible, allowing citizens to advance the political conception in different ways as the situation seems to demand. For example, in a divisive
debate about government support for religious schools, it may prove helpful, and stabilizing, to encourage religious citizens to express their arguments in terms of their comprehensive doctrine, if they do so in order to
show "how their comprehensive doctrines do indeed affirm" the essential
political values. 26 In a different case, suppose society is not well-ordered
and there is a profound division about constitutional essentials, as happened over slavery. In this case, the abolitionists were well advised to invoke the religious sources of their views, which were very meaningful for
many people; the same thing happened in the civil rights movement, except that there Martin Luther King, Jr. could also appeal to already established constitutional doctrines. Rawls argues that neither the abolitionists
nor King violated public reason, since they invoked religion "as the best
in which the ideal of
way to bring about a well-ordered and just society
27
public reason could eventually be honored."
Despite Rawls's support for the inclusive view, some religious critics
felt that the view was not inclusive enough. Philip Quinn focuses on cases
in which public reason fails to provide uniquely reasonable answers to
troubling questions. 28 Rawls's ideal then asks us to try for a balance of
values that we think other citizens will see as reasonable, or at least not
unreasonable. 2 9 Quinn argues that in order to show our fellow citizens
how reasonable persons can affirm the balance of values we favor, we may
have to introduce elements of our comprehensive doctrine, and he worries that the requirement that citizens do this in ways "that strengthen the
ideal of public reason itself' may possibly prove too narrow. 30 One cannot
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

RAwLs, supra note 3, at 247.
Id.
Id. at 248.
See id. at 248-49.
Id. at 250.
See Philip L. Quinn, PoliticalLiberalisms and TheirExclusions of the Religious,

in RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 138-61(Paul Weithman ed., 1997).
Quinn does not actually produce a case in which he thinks the "inclusive view"
would give bad advice; he agrees with Rawls that it covers well the cases Rawls
discusses.
29. See RAwt.s, supra note 3, at 253.

30. See Quinn, supra note 28, at 152.
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be sure what the outcome of introducing a part of one's comprehensive
doctrine will be, and Quinn suggests that it may be unfair to require citizens to make such calculations before they explain themselves in ways that
may indeed be illuminating and helpful.
Whether this criticism is a strong one depends, I believe, on the further interpretation of Rawls's requirement. If it is understood as a requirement on the intentions of citizens, it is possible that it is not too
narrow; if, however, the requirement is one of rationalprediction-citizens
can introduce such elements only when they have good reason to expect
that doing so will strengthen the ideal of public reason-that may indeed
be too limiting, requiring a time-consuming and indeterminate inquiry
before expression is given to something citizens may feel helpful. Instead
of making the condition more explicit, however, Rawls removes it, as we
shall see.
Nicholas Wolterstorff focuses on cases where religious citizens are
moved to object to the treatment of the poor in their society. Such citizens, he says, will rightly feel themselves "silenced" by Rawls's constraints,
since they will want to appeal to their religious doctrines in saying why this
treatment is wrong.3 1 Why, says he, should I pretend these are not my real
reasons? Rawls's doctrine prevents religious citizens from having a "religiously integrated existence," forcing them to make a sharp division between reasons that they link closely in their own minds.3 2 It is not at all
clear to me that Rawls's "inclusive view" cannot handle the actual example,
which seems similar to Rawls's own examples of King and the abolitionists.
One might say, too, that part of living on respectful terms with others in a
pluralistic society is, precisely, learning how to segment one's existence in
certain ways; insofar as Wolterstorff objects to this segmentation, he may
be objecting to the very idea of a pluralistic liberal society based on the
values of mutual respect and reciprocity.
Paul Weithman makes a criticism that is, to my mind, especially telling
because it accepts Rawls's ideal of public reason and finds fault with the
doctrine of civility in terms of that idea. Religious citizens in a pluralistic
society need to understand one another, lest divisive conflicts emerge, says
Weithman. Often the best way to promote this mutual understanding is to
encourage them to bring their doctrines forward in public debate,
presenting in religious terms, for example, a narrative of the oppression
their group has suffered. Such religiously inflected narratives are familiar
31. See Nicholas Wolterstorff, Why We Should Reject What Liberalism Tells Us

About Speaking and Acting in Publicfor Religious Reasons, in RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM, supra note 28, at 162-81. Wolterstorff makes a number of other
points, but since there are serious misreadings of Rawls in his paper, I shall not
introduce them here.
32. Wolterstorff also questions the connection between respect and restraint,
though perhaps he is focusing on cases that Rawls later calls "declaration" and
"witnessing," in which one is not asking the other party to accept one's premises
and to be persuaded, but is rather just explaining the roots of one's own view.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol54/iss4/8
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to Americans, and they are often more explanatory and more gripping
than terms drawn from the abstract nature of the political conception.
Mutual trust and respect, far from being hindered by such appeals to religion, may be strengthened thereby. Sometimes it is helpful to conceive of
one's fellow citizens as members of a specific group whose narrative we
know; such contextualization often helps citizens to see how the values
others invoke are in fact supportive of the key ideas of the political conception. Weithman cites the case of Abraham Heschel, who sent a telegram to President Kennedy urging him to support an expensive plan to
aid African-Americans; he said that citizens of all faiths should support
such a plan because "[w]e forfeit the right to worship God as long as we
continue to humiliate Negroes." This invocation of religion, Weithman
argues, far from showing disrespect to fellow citizens, actually helps them
to understand the seriousness and force of Heschel's proposal. And yet
Rawls might well exclude it, even on the "inclusive" view.
I am less convinced than Weithman is by his example. First of all, it is
far from clear that an expensive plan of aid to minorities is among the
"constitutional essentials" with regard to which Rawls's duty holds. Given
that the difference principle is explicitly said not to be an essential, it is
likely that this plan would not be either. If it is not an essential, then
conversations regarding it are not regulated by any ethical duty; they are
part of the very inclusive give and take that Rawls envisages going on in the
"background culture," and the appeal to God in such a context would be
unproblematic. But suppose that it were an essential: isn't there a problem
about justifying a constitutional matter with reference to a monotheistic
conception of God, in a nation containing polytheists and non-theists of
many kinds, Hindus, Buddhists, Confucianists, Taoists, atheists, and so
forth? It is not clear that adequate respect is being shown to those religious and non-religious minorities when public discourse justifies a fundamental matter in terms of God's judgments on our deeds. On the other
hand, we can agree with Weithman to at least this extent: it is helpful to
understand where our fellow citizens are coming from in such matters,
and to that extent, unhelpful to invite them to conceal their views.
An important discussion of the whole issue of civility and restraint is
offered in Christopher J. Eberle's recent book, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics.33 Because Eberle's is a book-length treatment of the issue,
discussing not only Rawls but many other writers, and advancing an original view of the issues, it cannot be adequately treated here. Its rigor and
care make it essential reading for anyone interested in these questions. It
is difficult even to sketch its treatment of Rawls, because Eberle's questions
and categories do not always map precisely onto Rawls's, as is natural in a
major constructive work, and because Eberle, focusing on Political Liberalism, does not discuss in detail the successive modifications of Rawls's view
33.
(2002).

CHRISTOPHER

J.

EBERLE,

RELIGIOUS

CONVICTION

IN

LIBERAL
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in the 1996 preface and in "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited." But let
me try to state the essentials of his position. Eberle agrees strongly with
Rawls that citizens in a liberal democracy have a duty to pursue a public
justification for coercive laws and policies, and he agrees, as well, that a
public justification ought. to be one that citizens with different comprehensive views would find convincing, and one that involves a conscientious
attempt to understand other people's convictions and to engage in respectful dialogue with them. But what if they try and try, and are unable
to find such a public justification, and yet, on the basis of their religious
convictions, they believe that the matter is of enormous moral urgency?
(His central example involves financial aid to the poor in other nations.)
In such a case, Eberle argues, respect for one's fellow citizens does not
require restraint: believers may, compatibly with respect, offer their moral
or religious reasons as reasons for public action, and they may rightly vote
and act on the basis of those convictions. Their situation is utterly different ethically from that of a person who simply offers religious reasons without a conscientious prior search for public reasons.
This objection to Rawls's view seems to me a strong one. Whether it is
really an objection to Rawls's "inclusive view" remains unclear to me, since
Rawls treats as a special case the case in which society is not well-ordered,
and citizens plausibly feel that their nonpublic arguments are necessary
for the establishment of political justice, as might have been the case with
the abolitionists and Martin Luther King, Jr.3 4 In any case, it seems to me
that the objection is well handled by Rawls's later modifications of his view,
to which I now turn.
In response to criticisms of his doctrine of civility, Rawls made an important modification in his account which he gives briefly in the 1996 In35
troduction and more fully in "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited."
Rawls now introduces what he calls the "proviso": reasonable comprehensive doctrines may be invoked at any time, even in fundamental matters,
"provided that in due course public reasons, given by a reasonable political conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support."36 In his article, he
expresses the proviso as follows: "reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in public political discussion at
any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons-and not
reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines-are presented that are
sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced
34. See RAWLs, supra note 3, at 249-51.
35. See Paul J. Weithman, Citizenship and Public Reason, in LIBERAL PUBLIC REASON, NATURAL LAw AND MoRALrty 125-70 (R. George & C. Wolfe eds., 1999).

Weithman's article postdates Rawls's revision, and he is not fully satisfied by it.
Nonetheless, the sort of concern he raises seems to have been on Rawls's mind in
producing the revision. See PAULJ.
CITIZENSHIP

WEITHMAN, RELIGIONS AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF

180-211 (2002).

36. RAwLs, supra note 3, at xlix-l.
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are said to support." 37 (Here, as before, we need to think of the conditions as applying to discussion in the context of public decision-making,
not to informal discussions of constitutional essentials in the "background
culture.")
Rawls acknowledges that this new view, which he calls the "wide view
of public political culture," leaves a lot to be specified later on. 38 Who
must fulfill the proviso, and must it be the same person who invokes the
comprehensive doctrine? What does "in due course" mean? In the 1996
Introduction, Rawls seems to hold that it would be important, ultimately,
to produce a "clear and established" account of how the proviso is to be
appropriately satisfied. 3 9 In "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited," he
adopts a more flexible and pragmatic approach. Such matters, he says,
must be worked out "in practice and cannot feasibly be governed by a
40
clear family of rules given in advance."
The fuller discussion of the proviso in "The Idea of Public Reason
Revisited" makes it clear that Rawls means to leave no doubt that political
liberalism acknowledges the depth of comprehensive doctrines in people's
lives: citizens are to recognize "that the roots of democratic citizens' allegiance to their political conceptions lie in their respective comprehensive
doctrines, both religious and nonreligious." 4 1 Citizens are not asked to
conceal those roots. To reveal them strengthens stability, rather than
threatening it. They are, however, asked to bring them forward in a manner that is ultimately respectful of others who believe differently. Once
again, Rawls cites the abolitionists and the Civil Rights movement as cases
fulfilling the proviso-although without emphasizing, as he earlier did,
42
the distinction between well-ordered and non-well-ordered societies.
Sometimes, Rawls adds, it is positively good to invoke a comprehensive
doctrine, since then people can better understand how religious citizens
can square their comprehensive doctrine with the political conception:
introducing the doctrine opens the way for explanations that are very
helpful. He adds several suggestive passages about some further ways in
which comprehensive doctrines may be invoked: by "declaration" (statements to one another of each person's own doctrine), "conjecture" (a
good-faith attempt to characterize reasons someone of a different doctrine
might have for supporting the public political conception), and "witnessing" (expressing a principled faith-based reason for dissenting from an
established policy that is agreed to be just, although one's own doctrine
43
does not support it-the example is Quaker pacifism.)
37. Rawls, supra note 4, at 783-84.
38. See id. at 768.

39.
40.
41.
42.

See RA't.s, supra note 3, at 1 n.26.
Rawls, supra note 4, at 784.
Id. at 784-85.
See id. at 785-86.
43. See id. at 786.
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2009

11

VillanovaVILI-ANOVA
Law Review, Vol.LAW
54, Iss.REVIEW
4 [2009], Art. 8

[Vol. 54: p. 677

In these revisions Rawls has gone a very long way toward answering his
religious critics. In particular, Eberle's critique is well accommodated, for
the reasonable citizen may now offer his or her religious reasons, continuing over time to pursue a search for public reasons. All that is required is
that the citizens have a conscientious commitment to finding such reasons
in due course, and, perhaps, some degree of confidence that this will ultimately be possible. 44 Some may feel that Rawls has gone too far, in that
the elasticity of the proviso allows all sorts of religious appeals in politics,
with no clear way of showing that civility has been violated. Those who
feel that he has not gone far enough need to bring forward cases where
the wide view gives bad guidance. Rawls himself invites this sort of challenge, arguing that we cannot assess further criticism "in the abstract independent of actual cases."

45

I am not sure where Greenawalt's objections fall among the positions
investigated in this discussion because he gives relatively little detail. Nor
am I sure whether he is attacking one of Rawls's positions or, instead, a
more extreme view such as that of Audi. Concerning my own view, however, suffice it to say that I am most drawn to Rawls's last view, with all of its
elasticity, and I have outlined here the reasons for my adherence to that
position.
II.

REPLY TO SCHENK

I have learned a great deal from Schenk's illuminating discussion of
the Catholic tradition regarding conscience and religious difference. He
articulates eloquently a position he and I share with regard to respect:
respect is addressed to the faculties of the person, not to the correctness of
their employment. Because I find myself in agreement with so much that
he says, I can only add three supplementary notes.
The first one regards the human rights tradition. Within the history
of Western philosophy, there are two distinct strands of thought that lead
from a reflection on human dignity to an account of human rights and the
duties of governments to respect them. Schenk has well described crucial
elements of the Catholic tradition. So far as ancient Greek philosophy is
concerned, this tradition owes its greatest debt to Aristotle. There is also,
however, a separate strand, though frequently interwoven with this Aristotelian tradition. The strand that most influences my own work, when I
describe the capabilities approach, begins from Greek and Roman Stoic
ideas and continues through a primarily Protestant tradition of thought
about rights and conscience, some of whose outstanding exemplars are
Hugo Grotius, Roger Williams, and Immanuel Kant.
44. That requirement may seem too strong to Eberle, but in the case where
society is reasonably well-ordered, it is probably not too strong; Eberle's critique
gets too much mileage by its focus on the case of grave social injustice and
disorder.
45. See RAwLs, supra note 3, at li.
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The Stoic position begins from an assertion that all human beings are
equal, in virtue of their possession of a faculty of valuation and choice,
which they identify with the presence of a faculty that they call the
hgi'monikon, or directive faculty, a faculty, then, concerned with directing
us through life, ranking and ordering values, and proposing a plan of action accordingly. Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics from the start assert that
male and female, slave and free, citizen and alien, are all equal, and that
social circumstances merely create an illusion of inequality that morality
ought to try hard to dispel.4 6 Thus the modern exponents of this tradition
do not need to struggle with the unfortunate baggage of Aristotle's
thought regarding slaves and women. Unlike Aristotle, again, the exponents of this tradition see our ethical duties as utterly world-wide in nature, since they hold that all human beings are, first and foremost,
"citizens of the entire world," kosmou politai, not simply citizens of a particular city-state. This aspect of the Stoic tradition, again, proves valuable
when transferred to the modern era, since it provides a foundation for
Grotius's account of just and unjust wars, the aspiration of all human beings to peace, and the duties we have not to conduct ourselves excessively
during even a just war. The Aristotelian tradition has such elements as
well, but in spite of Aristotle rather than with his aid. Kant's PerpetualPeace
47
is one of the crowning achievements of this tradition.
What I now want to suggest is that this tradition also has an easy time
defending a broad account of liberty of conscience, because it has from
the start valued all human lives equally, and has insisted that the directive
faculty needs to be respected wherever it is. Again, the Aristotelian tradition ultimately reaches the same destination, but with less help from its
ancient sources. Whereas Roman Stoicism was frequently used to ground
rebellion against the Roman Empire in the name of Republican liberty
and non-domination, the Aristotelian tradition could not draw on Aristotle for any account of political liberty or resistance to tyranny.
When the founders of the United States thought about republican
liberty, it was, as my book documents, primarily this Stoic tradition that
inspired them. 48 For this reason, the idea of liberty as non-domination,
freedom from arbitrary authority, came to play a central role in their
thinking, and the idea of a life in accordance with human dignity was,
thus, closely linked to the idea of republican institutions that protect basic
human rights. I think that by now contemporary Catholic thought has for
the most part reached the same destination, but perhaps its different starting point made it take somewhat longer to commit itself decisively to republicanism, and to the rejection of monarchy.
46. For the primary elements of this position, see my article Kant and Cosmopolitanism, in KANT's PERPETUAL PEACE 25-58 (James Bohman & Matthias LutzBachmann eds., 1997).
47. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (1795).
48. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF
AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGiOUS EQUALITY

72-114 (2008).
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My second comment pertains to the notion of human dignity. Both
Schenk and I consider this to be an important notion, and both he and I
give a specific account of human dignity, in connection with the faculty of
conscience and its unfolding. One must, however, bear in mind that the
concept of human dignity is a slippery one, which can do little philosophical work on its own, unless it is securely defined in terms of other concepts. I feel that today the notion is sometimes used somewhat more
casually, particularly in debates in bioethics. As a contributor to the volume of essays published by the President's Council on Bioethics, under
the direction of Ed Pellegrino, 49 I note that in that volume the notion of
dignity is used in many different ways, and not always well defined. At
times, one feels that an appeal to dignity is used to stop debate short in its
tracks, as if it were self-evident that certain proposed policies (e.g. stem
cell research) violate human dignity and must not therefore even be considered. I am not happy with that way of proceeding: I think we always
need precise definitions of our key concepts, and if different definitions
are offered for this key notion, we need to explore them by thinking about
the entire course of argument involved, rather than stopping debate short.
More and clearer argument is what we need here and it is not always
forthcoming.
Finally, I want to comment very briefly on the relationship between
dignity and conscience in my own work. In Women and Human Development5O and Frontiers of Justice,5 1 I articulate my "capabilities approach" in

connection with a notion of a life commensurate with, or worthy of,
human dignity. In my paper for the present symposium, I use the notion
of "conscience" to refer to one part of that idea of human dignity. It is,
however, not the entirety of that notion. Rape, domestic violence, and
deprivation of food are all violations of human dignity, but it would be
odd to call them offenses against conscience. Conscience, as I use the
notion, is the faculty of choice and direction, but human dignity resides, as
well, in our bodily nature and its health. Therefore, a good account of
human rights would be considerably broader than an account of rights of
conscience.
These are all addenda, not criticisms. Once again, let me thank
Schenk heartily for his illuminating paper.
III.

REPLY TO McGREEVY

In replying to McGreevy, first let me acknowledge the considerable
debt I owe to his illuminating work on the Catholic tradition, which I cite
often in Liberty of Conscience. I am also grateful to him for his supplementation, here, of the account that I provided, which helps balance the picture.
49. See Martha Nussbaum, Human Dignity and PoliticalEntitlements, in HUMAN
DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS

50.
51.

351, 351-80 (2008).

MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE (2006).
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To begin with a small point: I did not say that Roger Williams "bracketed" his religious convictions. I said, instead (see my Reply to Greenawalt) that he deliberately provides an argument for his political principles
that can be accepted by people who do not share his religious convictions. 52 Of course, he amply states those convictions, but, according to my
reconstruction of his argument, the convictions do not figure as essential
premises in his primary argument.
The primary point in McGreevy's paper that I wish to address, however, concerns individualism, and India. In my work on India,5 3 I have, of
course, observed much valuable solidarity among women and other disadvantaged groups, as they struggle for full equality. Where law and constitutional rights are concerned, however, my experience there has shown
me how crucial it is to frame fundamental political entitlements as individual rights-because groups contains hierarchies, and often subordinate
their more powerless members. When privileges are given to the family as
such, its weaker members, usually women and children, are apt to lose out.
When privileges are given under law to a religious group, its most powerless members, again often women, lose out. The system of "personal law"
in India, according to which four major religious (Hindu, Muslim, Parsi,
and Christian) have separate laws, passed by parliament but mediated by
clerics, in areas including family law, property, and inheritance, has led to
decades of sluggishness in women's attempt to achieve full equality. Christian women in India, for example, gained the right to divorce on grounds
of cruelty only in 2001-because it took that long for clerics from many
regional origins and denominations to get together and agree to listen to
the voices of women, and then to go to Parliament with a proposal for
legal change. So women lose out by virtue of the power granted to
unelected clerics. They also have rights that are unequal even to one another: a Christian woman gets a worse deal on divorce than other women
(or did before 2001) by the sheer accident of being born Christian. (Similarly, Muslim women have had particular difficulty with maintenance after
divorce, and Hindu women with shares in agricultural land.) The delegation of rights to a group has been a recipe for inequality.
Moreover, the personal law system has, for this reason, brought religion itself into disrepute. So many progressive people in India, from all the
traditions, describe themselves as secular, in part because they associate
religion with reactionary policies and secularism with change. Should a
group want to innovate by forming a new denomination or sect-as has so
frequently happened in the U.S.-such changes are impeded by the large
amount of legal power reposed in the traditional clergy. All in all, then,
the system of personal law and group rights seems to have been a bad
thing, both for people and for religion.
52. See supra Part I (Reply to Greenawalt).

53. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, THE CLASH WITHIN: DEMOCRACY, RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE,
AND INDIA'S FUTURE (2007).
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REPLY TO CHOPER

Choper's paper raises a number of important questions that would
require a lengthier discussion, if we were really to resolve them, than will
be possible here. Let me address, briefly, just five of them.
First, I believe, and have argued in Chapter 8, that there are significant differences between "In God We Trust" on our currency and the
words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. Justice O'Connor's very
helpful test for such entrenched religious references, proposed in Elk
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,54 is not correctly applied by her to
the case of the Pledge. By contrast to "In God We Trust," (which dates to
shortly after the Civil War), "under God" in the Pledge dates only to 1954,
and the debates surrounding it, which denigrate atheists, agnostics,
polytheists, members of non-theistic religions, and many standard theists,
are part of living memory. "Under God" is also part of a kind of act of
worship, and that prong of the O'Connor test also differentiates it from
"In God We Trust." So my view is that the words "under God" are unconstitutional (for the reasons of peer pressure to which Choper alludes, well
established in Lee v. Weisman 55 ), and that "In God We Trust" is not.
As for tax exemptions: I am not sure why Choper holds that even a
broadly based neutral program of tax exemptions that includes religious
bodies along with others (for example a tax exemption for charitable or
non-profit institutions) is unconstitutional. Walz v. Tax Commission56 certainly held otherwise, and I agree with the reasoning in that case. Texas
Monthly v. Bullock 57 is also pertinent: for there the Court struck down a
non-neutral sales tax exemption that went only to religious periodicals,
but stated that a neutral program would pass constitutional muster. I
think, indeed, that to exclude religious bodies from a program of subsidy
would itself raise constitutional problems, as was recognized in Rosenberger
58
v. University of Virginia.
Concerning government aid to religious people who want to purchase
religious insignia, such a program would plainly not pass constitutional
muster at present, given the precedents, and some principles that have
been introduced help us to see why. In thinking about school aid, the
Court has wisely focused on two pertinent issues: directness and choice.
Aid that goes directly to a religious body is highly suspect; aid that goes,
instead, to parents may possibly in some cases be all right. And aid is most
likely to be upheld if it is given in such a way as to permit choice between
59
religious and non-religious uses, as in the Cleveland voucher case,
(which, of course, had other special circumstances that contributed to the
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

542
505
397
489
515
536

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

1 (2004).
577 (1992).
664 (1970).
1 (1989).
819 (1995).
639 (2002).
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Court's decision, in particular the fact that the Cleveland public schools
had already been declared to be a disaster and were in federal receivership). In Choper's imaginary case, a program of insignia-buying is most
likely to be upheld if money is given to all families or all individuals for the
purpose of buying whatever symbols they choose, religious or non-religious. This would be a pretty weird program, and I can't imagine any city
council passing it. Moreover, if it were passed, we'd have to scrutinize it
carefully to see whether its primary purpose was really to advance religion,
and the inclusion of non-religious symbols was just a way of rendering that
project constitutional. The closest real case I can think of is, in fact, Rosenberger,where the Court struck down a practice of subsidizing a whole range
of student activity groups, political, artistic, and so forth, but excluding
only the religious group. 60 The inclusion of the religious group in such a
program was held to be not just permissible, but, in the circumstances,
required, and I think this was the right result.
As for the idea that Sherbert v. Verney6 1 represents the imposition on
taxpayers of compulsory support for religion, I suggest that we have, here,
a baseline problem. Against the baseline that the work week is arranged to
suit the convenience of standard Christians, putting Jews and Seventh-Day
Adventists on a plane of equality does cost something. So too, against the
baseline that the physical environment is designed for people who walk,
the full inclusion of people who use wheelchairs is costly. But why should
we use those baselines? Why not instead think that the baseline should be
whatever includes minorities on a plane of full equality with majorities? In
that case, the unemployment compensation, (which, by the way, does not
seem to me to impose a significant cost) would just be at that neutral baseline, and would not impose any extra burden.
Finally, the endorsement test: Choper says it is too subjective. But this
complaint could be made against so many useful tests in the law: the "reasonable person" standard in the law of homicide, norms of reasonable
care in the law of torts, and so many others. The point here is that law is
not a system of deductive principles, as Christopher Columbus Langdell
thought. Instead, it is a realm of judgment and perception, in which, in
many difficult cases, there is no substitute for thinking about all the details
of the case and grappling with many contextual factors. One of our greatest judges, Benjamin Cardozo, wrote in his autobiography:
I was much troubled, in my first years upon the bench, to find
how trackless was the ocean on which I had embarked. I sought
for certainty. I was oppressed and disheartened when I found
that the quest for it was futile. I was trying to reach land, the
solid land of fixed and settled rules, the paradise of a justice that
would declare itself by tokens plainer and more commanding
60. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819-46.
61. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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than its pale and glimmering reflections in my own vacillating
62
mind and conscience.
After years of being a judge, however, Cardozo understood that this "solid
land" of certainty was not attainable, and that the judge must grapple with
the indeterminacies of hard cases as best he can. In a similar spirit, I
would conclude that the fact that a test requires careful contextual
thought is not a point against that test, it is simply a sign that the test is
realistic, suited to the complex world we actually inhabit, rather than a
merely fictive "paradise."
V.

REPLY TO STONE

I am grateful to Stone for devoting his paper to this very important
topic. As he knows, I have recently completed a new book on the topic of
sexual orientation and constitutional law, for a series on constitutional law
that he edits for Oxford University Press. 63 Lest readers think, however,
that the topic of same-sex marriage is not pertinent to Liberty of Conscience,
I do address it in Chapter 8, where I consider contemporary controversies.
Although I argue that the Religion Clauses of the Constitution are not, in
the end, pertinent to its resolution, I also argue that considering the history of American debates over religion can teach us something important
about how to approach it. Specifically, when we understand the way in
which people, anxious about economic, social, or political change, stigmatize new or unpopular groups, failing to recognize their entitlements, we
can understand that the struggle of gays and lesbians for respect and recognition is not all that unlike the struggle of Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Roman Catholics for equal respect.
In my new book, I argue that the best approach to the issue of samesex marriage in constitutional law is the approach Stone mentions at the
start of his paper, building on the idea that marriage is a fundamental
personal right under the Due Process Clause, and, at the same time (as the
"right to marry" cases typically do) invoking the Equal Protection Clause
in arguing that a right accorded to many cannot be denied to some without a very strong justification. (I argue that the Court ought to recognize
sexual orientation as a suspect classification for Equal Protection purposes, as several state courts have recently done in interpreting their state
constitutions.)
Stone argues, however, that the issue of same-sex marriage is also pertinent to the Religion Clauses, because it involves dragooning all individuals to lead their lives in accordance with the religious beliefs of a particular
group. He observes in Note 18 that "No thoughtful person takes seriously
the claim that the hostility to same-sex sex and same-sex marriage is not

AND

62. BENJAMIN CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166 (1921).
63. See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw (forthcoming 2010).
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rooted in Christian religious belief."64 Well, I am a counter-example to
this claim, as Stone knows from his wonderful editorial work on my book.
I believe, and argue, that opposition to same-sex sex and same-sex marriage is rooted, instead, in a more universal and deep-rooted human tendency to disgust at the body, which typically gets projected onto some
group or groups in society that seem conveniently to symbolize that which
the dominant group fears in itself (smell, waste products, decay, liquids,
etc.). This tendency can be seen in many different types of stigmatization
and discrimination in anti-Semitism, misogyny, racial hatred, and castebased hatred, among others. The ideas that propel this type of discrimination are not, at their root, moral ideas or theological ideas: they are ideas
of contamination and defilement, ideas about what we don't want to have
happen to our bodies. Such ideas may often be cloaked in moral or religious ideas, but close study will show that the religious argument is not what
is really driving the discrimination or giving it its virulence.
I think that such a close study will show us that the vehemence of
opposition to same-sex marriage does not come in any major way from the
Judeo-Christian tradition.
First of all, not all opponents of same-sex marriage are religious. The
primary predictor of opposition is age, rather than religious membership.
Many secular groups in recent history (Marxists of many types, for example) have vehemently opposed same-sex activity.
Second, not all Christians and Jews are against same-sex marriage.
Some denominations (Reform, Conservative, and ReconstructionistJudaism, Unitarian Universalism) support same-sex marriage. Mainline Protestant denominations are deeply divided over the issue, and the Episcopal
Church has taken a stand, permitting the ordination of Bishop Eugene
Robinson, an openly gay man living in a committed partnership with another man, that risks fracturing the Anglican Communion. Roman Catholic clergy and lay people are divided also, although the Church hierarchy
is firmly opposed. It is true that some evangelical groups and the Mormon
Church are single-mindedly opposed, and that the latter, at least, has
spent a lot of money campaigning against same-sex marriage, but this
hardly proves that opposition to same-sex marriage flows from religious
principle.
If we examine the biblical texts that are usually taken to justify opposition to same-sex marriage (as I do in Chapter 8), we find that they are far
narrower and more disputed than they are usually taken to be, and we also
find that dozens of other prohibitions in Leviticus and Deuteronomy are utterly ignored (for example, the injunction to stone fortune tellers). As I
argue in Chapter 8, this selectivity shows us that we need to look deeper
for a reason why this one half-sentence of Leviticus is regarded as all-important, and so many other sentences are not.
64. Geoffrey R. Stone, Same Sex Marriageand the Establishment Clause, 54 VILL.

L. REv. 617, 621 n.18 (2009).
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If we then examine the rhetoric of the opponents of same-sex marriage, we find that a theme running throughout is disgust at the sex acts
that gay men, in particular, perform. They are repeatedly portrayed as
defiling and contaminating, as I show in my new book by analyzing the
pamphlet literature circulated by groups opposing legalization. I then argue that only these deeper ideas of contamination and defilement explain
the extraordinary claim that the legalization of same-sex marriage would
spoil heterosexual marriages-which are never taken to be spoiled or defiled by the permitted marriages of people who are cruel, or irresponsible,
or criminal.
These facts make me conclude that the Religion Clauses are not pertinent in the way that Stone suggests, and that a more traditional approach
through the Fourteenth Amendment is still our best legal approach.
VI.

REPLY TO BRENNAN

Let me take this opportunity to thank Brennan very warmly for organizing this entire symposium, and for all his graciousness and good
work therein.
Brennan's spirited paper shows a striking awareness of many of my
writings, so I wish to thank him for his care and wide-ranging reading. I
first address two small points, and then turn to the more interesting issues
involving overlapping consensus, and religious equality.
Brennan writes rhetorically and somewhat unfairly, when he states
that my description of the U. S. tradition involves "cherry-picking from our
own tradition"-as if that were something underhanded and bad. But, of
course, I pick some things and leave others to one side, because my entire
project is a normative philosophical project. My aim is to describe an attractive set of principles that can, I believe, be defended by good philosophical arguments, to give those arguments, and then to show that these
attractive principles are embodied in some aspects of our tradition,
though not, I continually stress, in all. So I don't think this is a useful
criticism.
As for the quotation from my article on Skepticism About PracticalRea35
son in Literatureand the Law6
: I think it important to note that any remark

I make about my own or any other comprehensive ethical doctrine is utterly irrelevant to my arguments about political principles, since I have
consistently defended a form of political liberalism similar to that defended by John Rawls in his book of that name. 66 Like Rawls, I hold that
we should never base political principles on any comprehensive ethical
doctrine, since ethical doctrines are subjects of reasonable disagreement
in pluralistic societies. Since Brennan cites amply from works in which I
develop this Rawlsian position, I assume he is familiar with that view of
65. Martha Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the
Law, 107 HARv. L. REv. 714 (1994).
66. See RAwLS, supra note 3.
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mine. So he really should inform his readers that the Skepticism article is,
as it announces, about ethics, and thus has nothing to do with arguments
for political principles.
Now to the more interesting issues. Brennan appears to believe that if
we show that a given principle is not right now the object of consensus,
that is sufficient to refute the claim that an overlapping consensus of the
type both Rawls and I favor can be built around it. But that is not the way
in which either Rawls or I employ the notion of overlapping consensus. In
Chapter 6 of FrontiersofJustice, I state, "To... justify the conception, we do
not have to show that the consensus exists at present; but we do need to
show that there is sufficient basis for it in the existing views of liberal constitutional democracies that it is reasonable to think that over time such a
consensus may emerge." 67 Here, I am simply following Rawls. As Rawls
explicitly says, "[P] olitical liberalism looks for a political conception ofjustice that we hope can gain the support of an overlapping consensus of
reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines in a society regulated by it."68 That is of course very different from claiming that the society in question must already have such a consensus. In the relevant
chapter of his book, he sketches an attractive transition process that he
thinks could conceivably take place in our own society, from a modus
vivendi to an overlapping consensus. All he wants to show is that this transition is possible and that there is sufficient material in our society to bring
it about. That is all I too am trying to show, and I think that the fact that
the principles I admire are deeply rooted in our tradition-certainly not
alone, but really there-gives us sufficient reason to think that a transition
to an overlapping consensus is possible and plausible.
Now to the basis of equality. In earlier writings, I employed a notion
of "basic capabilities," suggesting that people have to have at least a minimum set of innate human powers in order to be worthy of equal respect.
In my more recent work, focusing on the entitlements of people with disabilities, I now withdraw this claim. 69 Now all that a human being has to
have in order to be worthy of fully equal concern and fully equal political
entitlements, is some type of sentience and active striving. (I thus rule out
the person in a persistent vegetative condition, and the anencephalic person. I do not rule out the person with extremely severe cognitive disabilities, unable to speak, etc.) I feel that it's important to put these recent
changes of position on the record. I shall not go into the details of my
position on disability further, since it is amply covered in Frontiers ofJustice
70
and in a new article.
67.
68.
69.
70.
ple with
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supra note 53, at 388.

See RAwLs, supra note 3, at 10.
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Now to anti-discrimination laws. Brennan suggests that I would favor
forcing the Catholic Church to ordain women. I have never said this, and
I do not believe it. I think we ought to distinguish three different cases of
employment: (a) core religious functions; (b) functions so closely bound
up with religious functions that policing them would lead to an intolerable
level of intrusion into religion; and (c) other employment functions. I do
not favor interference in (a), because I think that a necessary condition of
individual religious liberty is allowing churches some measure of autonomy in core religious areas. I do not favor interference in (b) for the
reason given by the Court in Corporationof the PresidingBishop of the Church
ofJesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 71 where the Court held that federal anti-discrimination law does not apply to the case of a janitor in the
Temple in Salt Lake City who was fired for not being a Mormon in good
standing, because to involve the courts all the time in distinguishing between religious and non-religious functions is too intrusive. Where (c) is
concerned, however, I think we should be stricter. All the major Catholic
universities, with the exception of Georgetown, have presidents who must
by statute be a member of a given order of priests, hence male. Being a
university president is not a core religious function, nor is it difficult to
distinguish from one. Although it is a truly hard case to say whether such
universities may be permitted to discriminate on grounds of religious
membership-since affiliation with a tradition may indeed be a bona fide
occupational qualification-I think it is not hard to conclude that being
male is not a bona fide occupational qualification. I believe that federal
anti-discrimination law should be invoked in this case. Or, another route
to a related conclusion, the Court should remove the tax-exempt status of
such universities, with reasoning similar to that used in BobJones University
v. United States,72 where a university that forbade interracial dating on religious grounds lost its tax exemption. In that case, the Court granted that
there was a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion of the members of that group, but they reasoned that the compelling state interest of
not lending government approval to racism trumped that burden. I believe that a similar outcome in the case of gender bias in education would
be correct. No doubt many other universities would quickly realize the
wisdom of Georgetown's change, if the government proceeded in this way;
and I see no reason why a Catholic university cannot retain a robust Catholic character with a lay president. I believe that Georgetown (of which I
am proud to be an alumna, having received an honorary degree there in
2003) does retain that character, and it shows greater respect for women.
There are many other difficult cases to discuss, in which religious bodies wish to discriminate, whether on grounds of religious membership or
on grounds of sex or sexual orientation. There is no time to discuss these
71. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).

72. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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cases here. I do believe, however, that the three-fold classification I have
introduced above is useful as we proceed further.
VII.

REPLY TO GARNETT

Garnett's paper raises very important issues concerning the Establishment Clause that I am eager to address. Let me begin, however, with two
smaller points. The first concerns conscience. Garnett, approvingly citing
Steve Smith, argues that the notion of conscience derives from religious
ways of thinking. Well, yes and no. As I argue in my Reply to Schenk, the
conscience tradition, in at least one of its prominent strands, can be traced
back to the thought of the Greek and Roman Stoics, which was religious in
73
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a sense, but which did not involve belief in a transcendent deity.
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prominently inside human
set themselves in this Stoic tradition point out (as I mentioned in my Reply
to Greenawalt) that their arguments are valid even for one who does not
believe in God. 7 4 Kant similarly held that moral arguments were and must
be independent of religious belief. I think that focus on the Roman Catholic aspect of the conscience tradition should not obscure this other
strand, which has great importance for modern thought.
The second small point I want to emphasize is that I have argued,
discussing Lee v. Weisman, that coercion is not necessary for an Establishment Clause violation. Garnett appears to agree with Justice Kennedy's
analysis in that case, and I simply want to point out that I do not and have
argued against it in chapter 6 of my book.
75
Now to Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. To show how I
respond to Garnett's argument, I must describe the case and its background in somewhat more detail than he does. Since the seventeenth century, as I argued in Chapters 2 and 3 of my book, it has been well
understood that establishments of religion threaten individual liberty of
conscience, and are thus grievous burdens on citizens. This threat was a
central theme of James Madison's famous Memorial and Remonstrance, discussed in Chapter 3, which focused on the evil of taxing citizens for the
support of the established Anglican Church. 76 The tax that Madison opposed was a mild one, since non-Anglicans could divert their tax payments
to their own churches, or to a fund for the support of teachers of religion;
Quakers and Mennonites were not required to pay at all. Nonetheless,
Madison argued that the bare announcement that the Anglican Church
was the default option burdened citizens by making a statement that cre73. See supra Part II (Reply to Schenk).
74. See supra Part I (Reply to Greenawalt).
75. 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
76. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 10-11 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981).
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ated an inequality in basic civic standing, saying that some citizens were in
an in-group and others were not.
Citing Madison, the Court in 1968, in Flast v. Cohen,77 adopted an
unusually broad account of standing in the context of Establishment
Clause challenges, saying:
The concern of Madison and his supporters was quite clearly that
religious liberty ultimately would be the victim if government
could employ its taxing and spending powers to aid one religion
over another or to aid religion in general. The Establishment
Clause was designed as a specific bulwark against such potential
abuses of government power, and that clause of the First Amendment operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power .... 78
Flast concerned a specific appropriation, and thus did not address the
question of spending for religious purposes that derives from general discretionary funds. The use of such funds by the Executive to hold conferences in connection with the Faith-Based Initiatives was challenged by a
citizen group in Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Chao.79 In 2006, a
three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge
Richard Posner, held that the group does have standing under Fast to
challenge the appropriations for these conferences. In Hein, the Supreme
Court reversed.8 0 The plurality opinion, written by justice Alito and
joined by justices Roberts and Kennedy, holds that the Seventh Circuit
interpreted F/ast too broadly: it protects taxpayer standing only in the case
of specific Congressional appropriations. Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurring, favor overruling F/ast altogether.8 1 Justice Souter's dissenting
opinion, joined by justices Breyer, Ginsberg, and Stevens, agrees with the
Seventh Circuit.8

2

Garnett, in his paper for this symposium, takes the po-

sition of Justices Scalia and Thomas, urging that F/ast was wrong. We
should notice, then, that he is taking a more extreme position than he
needs to take to defend Hein. Nor, it seems to me, does he present any
argument against the Flast majority's extremely plausible reading of
Madison and the Establishment Clause tradition. Fast,it seems to me, is
on solid ground when it asserts that citizens are severely burdened if government can tax for religious purposes, and that they thus have standing
to contest such a policy. I believe he has provided no good argument for
overruling F/ast.
Flast,however, concerns a direct appropriation for religious purposes,
and the Posner opinion extends it by applying the conclusion of Fast to
77. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).

78. Id. at 103-04 (citations omitted).
79. 433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006).
80. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 587.

81. See id. at 618-37 (Scalia, J. concurring).
82. See id. 637-43 (Souter, J. dissenting).
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the President's use of his discretionary funds. Discretionary funds come,
of course, from the taxpayers, but they are not raised in a religion-specific
assessment. Because Hein thus extends Fast, it is a difficult case from the
legal point of view, a case in which both the plurality and the dissenters
have substantial legal arguments, and in which a larger than usual part is
therefore inevitably played by a judge's sense of the nature of the problem
and its history. Judge Posner does indeed defend a broad reading of Flast
that is not absolutely entailed by the text (although his powerful argument is buttressed by his use of Bowen v. Kendrick8 3). Nonetheless, when
one considers the importance of the underlying issue at stake, it is difficult
not to be alarmed by the plurality's indifference to the problem of minority conscience, a central issue in our political tradition since long before
the Founding. The problem Judge Posner raises is a large one: if F/ast is
not read broadly, the Executive would be permitted, even, to erect a "national mosque," using taxpayer money. Judge Posner chooses his example
hypothetically, preserving a polite detachment from political reality, but
the reality would be, of course, the use of taxpayer money to create a national Christian Church, or in countless other ways to sponsor programs
that put the official stamp of approval on Christianity and implicitly disendorse and marginalize other religions. (The taxpayer group's challenge
used the language of endorsement and disendorsement, familiar from Justice O'Connor's reformulation of Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, to
express what they find troubling about the President's choices.)
In a case where the law is difficult and to some extent indeterminate,
"perception" often plays the deciding role. In this case, the dissenters are
rightly worried about the threat to equal liberty of conscience posed by the
use of taxpayer money for religious purposes, and the plurality, writing as
if the burden of an imagined flood of litigation were the major problem
presented by the case, exhibits a startling indifference to an issue that is so
deeply implicated in the whole history of our nation. Equal liberty of conscience, as Madison made clear, lies at the root of more or less all of our
entitlements as citizens, since it affects our ability to enter the public
square "on equal conditions."8 4 I thus disagree very strongly with Garnett
and I think we can see that we are now, after Hein, in a perilous situation,
vulnerable to the creation of all sorts of Establishment Clause violations by
a President. Even though these violations may be ever so clear and ever so
threatening, Hein concludes that no citizen has standing to challenge
them so long as the President uses his discretionary funds. This seems to
me a result that is unacceptable for the future of our nation. 85

83. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).

84. See MADISON, supra note 76.
85. See my general discussion of Hein and other cases from the 2006 Term in

my Supreme Court Foreword, Constitutions and Capabilities: "Perception"Against Lofty
Formalism, 121 HARv. L. REv. 9 (2007).
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